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Public trust and government betrayal · Study

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ArticlePublic trust and government betrayal

Christopher J. Phelan2005

Article2005

Public trust and government betrayal

Christopher J. Phelan

167 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

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Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 167 citations exist upstream.

References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 1983Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy 1982Reputation and imperfect information 1982Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence 1986A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information 1992Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility 1999What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset 2001Who Wants a Good Reputation?

Cited by

2014Limited records and reputation bubbles 2014Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model 2009Sovereign risk: constitutions rule 2013Dynamic sender–receiver games 2020Motivational Ratings 2014Seller reputation: From word-of-mouth to centralized feedback 2013Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information 2009A Theory of Credit Scoring and Competitive Pricing of Default Risk 1

Details

Year2005

Typearticle

Published2005-10-20

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations167

Files0 public / 0

ShelfFiscal Policies and Political Economy

Identifiers

doi10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.003

openalex_workW2000685927

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