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Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues
8 references·3 citing·25 second hop
Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues (1997)Stability of Matchings When Individuals H…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingThe college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Job Matching, Coalition Forma…Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers (1981)Job Matching with Heterogeneo…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…Entrepreneurship and organization design (2012)Entrepreneurship and organiza…Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms (2011)Many-to-one matching markets …A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2005)A Theory of Stability in Many…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignManipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)Matching with Contracts (2005)Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities (1957)Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching (1990)Supermodularity and Complementarity (2011)Cores of convex games (1971)The assignment game I: The core (1971)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)On cores and indivisibility (1974)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes1,307 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 1981Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers485 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms82 cited
  • 2005A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets75 cited
  • 2012Entrepreneurship and organization design10 cited

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