Performance and Capital Structure of Privatized Firms in Europe

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze whether there are differences in performance between private firms and recently privatized firms in the European Union, as well as to determine whether ownership (state-owned versus private) and regulation affect capital structure. Focusing on economic reasons that justify privatizations, we analyze whether there are differences between recently privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms in their profitability, leverage and efficiency during the period 1999–2002. Also, we analyze the determinants of the capital structure of these firms. Contrary to previous studies, our results show that privatized firms are not less efficient than firms with private ownership.

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