Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good

Eoin O’Connell

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Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

Abstract This paper considers two contenders for the title of highest good in Kant's theory of practical reason: happiness proportioned to virtue and the maximization of happiness and virtue. I defend the ‘proportionality thesis’ against criticisms made by Andrews Reath and others, and show how it resolves a dualism between prudential and moral practical reasoning. By distinguishing between the highest good as a principle of evaluation and an object of agency, I conclude that the maximization of happiness and virtue is a corollary of the instantiation of the proportionality thesis.

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References

1990Kant's Theory of Freedom 2001Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 2006The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy 2002Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 2007Belief in Kant 1992The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory 1988Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant 1970Kant's moral religion

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2020Kant’s coherent theory of the highest good

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