Constructive Empiricism and the Argument from Underdetermination

Abstract

Abstract This chapter examines the arguments van Fraassen gives for constructive empiricism. Van Fraassen is often presented as giving some version of the argument from underdetermination: the argument which holds that since theories always have empirically equivalent rivals, empirical evidence can never adjudicate between a theory and its rivals, and hence belief in any theory is unfounded. It is argued that van Fraassen does not give any version of the argument from underdetermination, and that the argument from underdetermination is incompatible with van Fraassen's epistemological views.

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