Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking

Abstract

Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking GUENTER ZOELLER WELL OVER A HUNDRED years before Sigmund Freud was to proclaim that the I (Ich) is not the master in its own house, the German physicist and essayist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742--1799) entered the following line of thought into one of the "waste books" (Sudelb'i.icher) that came to establish his posthumous fame as an aphoristic prose writer:' Wir werden uns gewisser Vorstellungen bewul3t, die nicht yon uns abh~ingen; andere glauben, wit wenigstens hingen von uns ab; wo ist die Grenze? Wir kennen nut allein die Existenz unserer Empfindungen, Vorstellungen und Gedanken. Es den~, sollte man Work on this paper was supported by a developmental assignment from the University of Iowa during the fall of 199o, and was carried out at Iowa's Center for Advanced Studies. Throughout the paper, references to Lichtenberg's writings and letters are to the most recent edition: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Schriftenund Briefe, ed. Wolfgang Promies; vol. 1: Sudelhiicher; vol. 2: Sudelbticher II, Materialhefte, TagebCicher; vol. 3: Aufs~tze, Entwiirfe, Gedichte, Erkl~irung der Hogarthschen Kupferstiche; vol. 3/K: Kommentar zu Band 3; vol. 4: Briefe; (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1967-1974). The commentary to volumes one and two, which contain the waste books, has not yet appeared. The waste book entries are additionally identified by the numeration system employed in Promies's edition, with the letter indicating the waste book and the number reflecting the order of appearance within a given waste book. Through the conversion charts provided by Promies's edition, the references can also be traced to the only critical, but incomplete edition of Lichtenberg's waste books (GeorgChristophLichtonberg~ Aphorismen. Nach den Handschriften herausgegeben yon Albert Leitzmann, 5 fasc., Deutsche Literaturdenkmale des achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Nr. t 23, 13t, 136, 14o, 141 [Berlin, 19o2-19o8]). All translations are my own. Engiish-language editions of Lichtenberg's aphorisms are highly selective and do not focus on the philosophical material: The Lichtenberg Reader, ed. F. H. Maumer and H. Hatfield (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959) [abridged as Lichtenberg , Aphorisms 6~ Letters (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969)]; Lichtenberg, Aphorisms, tr. R. J. IIollingdale (London/New York: Penguin, 199o). References to Kant's wridngs are to Kants gesammelteSchriften, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences and its successors (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later de Gruyter, 19ooff.). Citations and quotations from the Crit~ ofPure Reasonrefer to the original pagination of the revised (second) and original (first) edition CB" and "A," respectively). The translation used is that by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's, 1965), with occasional emendations. [417] 418 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 30:3 JULY x99~ sagen, so wie man sagt: es blitzt. Zu sagen cogito, ist schon zu viel, so bald man es durch Ich denke fibersetzt. Das lch anzunehmen, zu postulieren, ist praktisches Bedfirfnis. t (We become conscious of certain representations that are not dependent upon us; others believe that at least we are dependent upon ourselves; where is the border line? We know only the existence of our sensations, representations and thoughts. One should say,/t thinks, just as one says,/t lightens. It is already saying too much to say cogito, as soon as one translates it as I think. To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.) Lichtenberg's provocative aphorism on the "it thinks," first published in 1801, soon made its way into Austrian philosophy. It is quoted with approval in Ernst Mach's Analysis of Sensations3 and referred to in the writings of the Austrian-born philosopher of language, Fritz Mauthner.4 From Vienna, the aperfu infiltrated linguistic philosophy to the point of becoming a virtual topos for antimetaphysical thinking about the self.5 Due to its association with Mach's phenomenalism and Mauthner's "psychology without soul, "e Lichtenberg's statement on the "I think" is typically interpreted as a rejection of the substantialist view of the self as a thinking thing and as a defense of the bundle theory of the self. The historical frame of reference thus provided places Lichtenberg against Descartes and together with Hume.7 Against this prevalent view, I want to argue that Lichtenberg...

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