A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition

Emmanuelle Taugourdeau · Jean‐Pierre Vidal

64 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Public Economic Theory

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Local Government Finance and Decentralization Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

Abstract

Models of tax competition usually assume a single‐period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization cannot prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way to achieve fiscal policy harmonization is to set up a central fiscal authority.

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1991Asymmetric tax competition 1991Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size 1989Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable

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2007Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?

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