Comparing Rational Choice and Prospect Theory Analyses: The U.S. Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm, January 1991

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to compare an expected utility rational actor model of decision making with a Prospect theory psychological model of decision making. Each theory is presented and then applied to the well known case surrounding the United States’ decision to launch Operation ‘Desert Storm’ in January 1991 at the outset of the Gulf War. Our goal is not to present new findings concerning the origins or outcomes of the Gulf conflict so much as to use the case to compare and illuminate the similarities and differences of these two theoretical approaches. Our approach does not assume that these two models are necessarily mutually incompatible alternatives. Our goal is to analyze this case in order to discover the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each model, and to determine how much analytic purchase can be gained by combining them. Finally, we offer some conclusions concerning this contrast.

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