MORAL OBLIGATION AND CHANGES IN PERSONAL IDENTITY; pp. 179–187

Søren Holm

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Ethics and bioethics in healthcare Legal Rights and Human Rights

Abstract

The possibility of a human person changing personal identity raises questions concerning what the moral obligations of the new person are. Do obligations endure through a change of identity or are they extinguished? Both horns of this dilemma create philosophical and practical problems. In this paper I will argue that many relational obligations do bridge changes in personal identity. I first consider two analogies of human personal change, e.g. changes in legal personality of companies and issues in state succession. In both cases relational obligations bridge a change of legal personality. I then argue that a wide range of relational obligations similarly survive in the case of changes in human personal identity, and that holding this view does not commit us to a problematic ontology of obligations.

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198611. Reasons and Persons 1979Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.1963The Language of Morals 1986Reasons and Persons.1998The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States under International Law

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