Institutional boundaries and common‐pool resource management: A comparative analysis of water management programs in California

Abstract

Abstract Policymakers and academics often identify institutional boundaries as one of the factors that shape the capacity of jurisdictions to manage natural resources such as water, forests, and scenic lands. This article examines two key bodies of literature—common‐pool resource management theory and local public economy theory—to explain how the boundaries of political jurisdictions affect natural resource management. Two empirical methods were used to test hypotheses from the literature, using a study of water management programs in California. The results demonstrate that institutional boundaries that coincide with natural resources are likely to be associated with the implementation of more effective resource management programs. At the same time, where jurisdictions can control through coordination, they can also facilitate more effective resource management where jurisdictions do not match resource boundaries. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

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