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Bidder behavior in central bank repo auctions: Evidence from the Bundesbank

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References

1997The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions186 cited
2002Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions147 cited
1999Hedging Winner's Curse with Multiple Bids: Evidence from the Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction54 cited
1998Banks’ demand for reserves when future monetary policy is uncertain34 cited
2001Why did the banks overbid? An empirical model of the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank28 cited

Cited by

2009Bidding Behaviour in the ECB's Main Refinancing Operations during the Financial Crisis29 cited

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