SStudyAcademic Library

Dashboard Shelves Open access My library Review

Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated

Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance · Study

ArticleShelves

ArticleMoral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance

Michael D. Whinston1983

Article1983

Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance

Michael D. Whinston

41 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Public Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

Retirement, Disability, and Employment Social Policy and Reform Studies Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

No abstract was published for this record.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 41 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information 1977A model of insurance markets with incomplete information 1979On Moral Hazard and Insurance 1974Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 1977The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets 1978A model of social insurance with variable retirement 1980Income taxation with fixed hours of work 1980Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints

Cited by

2000Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets 2017Contract Design by Service Providers with Private Effort 2023Online or not online: the impact of business owner’s risk preference on the adoption of e-business

Details

Year1983

Typearticle

Published1983-10-01

VenueJournal of Public Economics

ISSN-L0047-2727

Languageen

Citations41

Files0 public / 0

ShelfRetirement, Disability, and Employment

Identifiers

doi10.1016/0047-2727(83)90056-7

openalex_workW2004043555

Links

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.