This article investigates the relationship between interdependence and conflict, using U.S.-Warsaw Pact trade and conflict data during détente as a case study. A theoretical framework is developed in which incentives to reduce conflict are related to the desire to protect the benefits of an interaction. Asymmetric interdependence can lead to linkage diplomacy and to greater conflict reduction by one side than the other. These hypotheses are tested empirically. A strong, inverse relationship between trade and conflict is found, and trade is found to cause a greater reduction in Warsaw Pact conflict than in U.S. conflict. We further investigate the relationship between trade and conflict in various types of goods, as well as the trade/conflict relationship between the United States and the individual Warsaw Pact members. These results are of importance in understanding the use of trade and other interactions as a diplomatic tool, and in comparing the foreign policies of particular Warsaw Pact members.
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