Agree to reform? The political economy of conditionality variation in International Monetary Fund lending, 1983–1997

Abstract

Abstract This article analyzes variation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality. Conditions attached to IMF loans vary qualitatively and quantitatively across time and space, contrary to the allegations of inflexibility and insensitivity. This study theorizes that despite the IMF's official rules to determine conditionality by economic criteria, variation arises because the strategic interests of the five biggest contributors to the IMF (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France) interfere with IMF policy, which potentially compromises the effectiveness of its programs. This theory is tested empirically against 398 conditionality agreements contracted between 1983 and 1997 using an event-count method based on the Poisson distribution to obtain statistical results supportive of the theory.

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