Explaining Electoral Reform

Abstract

Japan, Italy and New Zealand changed their electoral systems to similar (though also significantly different) mixed systems combining single-member districts and proportional representation in the early 1990s. I examine the reasons for these three reforms being enacted, showing that while common symptoms of system failures were important in setting the three reform movements in motion in like fashion, they were not compelling enough to push reluctant politicians to enact reform. Other country-specific factors were needed to intervene and force them to take action. Japan's reform was enacted without the imposition of the popular referendum that occurred in Italy and New Zealand, but was made possible by changes in the nature of party competition that favourably altered political parties' incentives to reform. The change was brought about by the presence of pro-reformers within the dominant party and the relative coincidence between reform and the interests of parties.

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