Modes of Thinking

Abstract

This article is a contribution to theoretical psychology. It is composed of three parts. The first part is postulatory; it explicates the minimal logical prerequisites for scientific cognition. Cognition requires at least a goal, an object, means of cognition and a cogitating subject. This set will be called the logically demanded voids of cognition. It will be shown that a `psychologizing' of the process of cognition leads to logical antinomies. The second part distinguishes between clearly distinctive programmes of psychological research, called modes of thinking. To become operative the differentiated set of voids of cognition has to be filled by content. Each specific mode of thinking is a consistent contentbased specification of this set. This will be explained by examples. The third part deals with the question of how to relate the conceptually separated modes of thinking. Is there a possibility of doing this with conceptual clarity and empirical productivity?

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