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Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability
4 references·4 citing·32 second hop
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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications3,198 cited
  • 1984Monopoly with Incomplete Information1,144 cited
  • 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
  • 1983Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction293 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power41 cited
  • 2020Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design38 cited
  • 2012Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity27 cited
  • 2010Informativeness, Incentive Compensation, and the Choice of Inventory Buffer22 cited

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