Political Equilibria with Social SecurityMichele Boldrín, Aldo Rustichini C2000-01-01articleReview of Economic Dynamics195 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Economic theories and modelsGame Theory and Voting SystemsEconomic Policies and ImpactsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 195 citations exist upstream.References1979Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?1976Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory1977A framework for social security analysis1988The Family and the State1975WHY THE SOCIAL INSURANCE BUDGET IS TOO LARGE IN A DEMOCRACY1999A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation1975Optimum Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model2000A Positive Theory of Social SecurityCited by2004Lessons for an ageing society: the political sustainability of social security systems2003Tax evasion in a model of endogenous growth2007The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems2007Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic2002Intergenerational Risk-Sharing via Social Security when Financial Markets Are Incomplete2005Optimal Response to a Demographic Shock