Beyond Presentism and Historicism: Understanding the History of Social Science

Abstract

The revival of interest in the social scientific past has stimulated a growing literature on the methodology of the history of social science. Existing “presentist” type histories have been criticized for their “Whiggish” assumptions about scientific progress. The critique of presentism is the product of a new school of historians of social science who advocate a “historicist” historiography. My paper is addressed to this discussion and falls into three parts. First, I review the principles of presentist and historicist historiographies, relating their methodological positions to their theories of science. Second, I take up the argument of the “new historicism” in more detail, criticizing its theory of textual interpretation and its theory of social scientific development. I conclude by offering an alternative historiographic model of social scientific development based upon a theory of science that I outline.

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