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Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
7 references·2 citing·23 second hop
Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry) (2000)Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous…A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Stu…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. (1991)A natural experiment in the o…Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingThe college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach (2016)Improving schools through sch…Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness (2006)Many-to-One Stable Matching: …Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions (1994)Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism (2005)Constrained school choice (2009)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)Politics, markets, and America's schools (1991)An invitation to market design (2017)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)On cores and indivisibility (1974)The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1999A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement567 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1991A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom.342 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness93 cited
  • 2016Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach74 cited

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