Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann, Hans-Jürgen Krambeck2002-01-01articleNature1,370 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationGame Theory and ApplicationsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 1,370 citations exist upstream.References1990Foundations of social theory2002Altruistic punishment in humans2000Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments1995The Handbook of experimental economics19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research2001Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment1998Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring1980Social DilemmasCited by2013Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review2013Human cooperation2015Is the desire for status a fundamental human motive? A review of the empirical literature.2014Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: A meta-analysis.2002Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games2005Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game2004Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem2013Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review