Rethinking the restorative–retributive dichotomy: is reconciliation possible?

Abstract

While the use of restorative justice within Western criminal justice systems continues to grow, its philosophical foundations remain uncertain. This inconclusiveness impacts directly upon the theoretical discussion of restorative justice and its relationship with existing paradigms of punishment, precipitating debate regarding its ability to integrate within justice systems governed by retributive paradigms. Specifically, this ambiguity of definition renders debate regarding the extent to which restorative justice philosophy exists as an alternative punishment or an alternative to punishment, and its existence as complementary or axiomatic to retributive justice unresolved. The philosophy of restorative justice, identifying its central features and addressing those previous attempts of contrasting restorative justice with the prevailing paradigm of retribution is explored here. However, it is suggested that aspirations of reconciling restorative justice philosophy with the retributive paradigm will be ultimately unsuccessful, due to the persistent latent ambiguity regarding the central foundation upon which restorative justice philosophy is built. Such concerns are also present when seeking to affirm the continued opposition of retributive and restorative justice.

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