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ArticleRepeated insurance contracts and moral hazard

Ariel Rubinstein1983

Article1983

Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard

Ariel Rubinstein · Menahem E. Yaari

265 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Insurance and Financial Risk Management Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Auction Theory and Applications

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1956An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs 1979On Moral Hazard and Insurance 1974Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 1981Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship

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1988Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions 1993Agency in health care: Getting beyond first principles 2000Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information 1985Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing 1990Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 1989Financial intermediation 1988The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem 2000Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets

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1987Multi-period insurance contractsarticle · 4 shared references 2000Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazardchapter · 4 shared references 2015Can Group Incentives Alleviate Moral Hazard? The Role of Pro-Social Preferencesarticle · 4 shared references 2009Incertain et information : où en sommes-nous trente-cinq ans après le Colloque de Paris?article · 4 shared references 2009Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Marketsarticle · 3 shared references 1991Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?article · 3 shared references

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Year1983

Typearticle

Published1983-06-01

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations265

Files0 public / 0

ShelfInsurance and Financial Risk Management

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doi10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7

openalex_workW2006690860

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