Welfare bureaus as moral tutors : What do clients learn from paternalistic welfare reforms ?

Abstract

This research tests the premise of paternalistic welfare reform that clients will alter their behavior in accordance to the application of sanctions or incentives to their welfare case. Over two hundred welfare clients were surveyed about their knowledge of program requirements and sanctions. The survey results were then compared to their actual records of sanction kept by the welfare agency. Chi-square and logit analyses were then conducted to ascertain whether the sanctioning process improved client knowledge of program requirements and the status of their personal case. Most clients do not learn program requirements, even when they experience sanctions. Rather, clients seem to learn to respond to the episodic demands of caseworkers for returning verification information. These findings suggest that welfare agencies confront limitations in their role as moral tutors. Our findings indicate that welfare reforms do not change clients' orientations as much as organize clients' lives to respond to administrative demands

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