INFLATION AND ELECTIONS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR SIX OECD ECONOMIES

Fredrik Carlsen

13 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Electoral Systems and Political Participation Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between post‐election inflation and the incumbent's re‐election chances using data for 50 elections in six OECD economies. Ijnd that post‐election inflation is above average if the election race is close but not if the incumbent's election prospects are very good or very poor. The theoretical part of the paper shows that this result is consistent with rational political business cycle models. (JEL E31)

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1975The Political Business Cycle 1987Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria 1987Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles 1988Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles 1992Political Cycles in OECD Economies 1991The International Almanac of Electoral History 1977A Political Model of the Business Cycle 1992MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*

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