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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited
11 references·10 citing·28 second hop
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited (2006)Self-enforcing international environmenta…A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution (2006)A Core-Theoretic Solution for…International cooperation for sale (2001)International cooperation for…Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation (2001)Game Theory and International…Coalitional Power and Public Goods (2001)Coalitional Power and Public …The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities (1997)The Core of an Economy with M…Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement (1997)Incentives to Participate in …A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution (1995)A core-theoretic solution for…Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements (1994)Self-Enforcing International …Strategies for the international protection of the environment (1993)Strategies for the internatio…International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions (1992)International environment con…On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership (1983)On the Stability of Collusive…Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations (2014)Addressing Global Environment…Modeling international climate change negotiations more responsibly: Can highly simplified game theory models provide reliable policy insights? (2013)Modeling international climat…Fiscal implications of climate change (2012)Fiscal implications of climat…The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence (2010)The problem of maintaining co…Determinants of pollution: what do we really know? (2010)Determinants of pollution: wh…Can international environmental cooperation be bought? (2009)Can international environment…A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements (2009)A Dynamic Model for Internati…Modesty May Pay ! (2008)Modesty May Pay !Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements (2006)Systematic uncertainty in sel…Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-a-vis WTO Law (2006)Can Emissions Trading Schemes…Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country (1991)Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors? (1996)The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements (1997)Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987)Game Theory with Applications to Economics (1992)International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations (2006)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)Equilibrium Binding Agreements (1997)Carbon pricing in climate policy: seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations (2017)Country-level social cost of carbon (2018)On balanced sets and cores (1967)Cores of convex games (1971)A Theory of Oligopoly (1964)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger (1983)An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development (1986)Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective (2007)Social Norms and Economic Theory (1989)Game Theory with Applications to Economics. (1989)Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem (2003)Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium (2011)Global Public Goods: A Survey (2021)Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements (2006)Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges (2008)Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2010)Advancing the Concept of Public Goods (2003)Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy (2015)Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics (2019)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1994Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements1,668 cited
  • 1993Strategies for the international protection of the environment1,211 cited
  • 1983On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership900 cited
  • 1992International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions448 cited
  • 1997The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities407 cited
  • 2001Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation366 cited
  • 2006A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution298 cited
  • 2001International cooperation for sale263 cited
  • 1997Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement262 cited
  • 1995A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution252 cited
  • 2001Coalitional Power and Public Goods190 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements138 cited
  • 2009A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements123 cited
  • 2014Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations112 cited
  • 2009Can international environmental cooperation be bought?

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109 cited
  • 2010Determinants of pollution: what do we really know?105 cited
  • 2006Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-a-vis WTO Law98 cited
  • 2008Modesty May Pay !92 cited
  • 2013Modeling international climate change negotiations more responsibly: Can highly simplified game theory models provide reliable policy insights?78 cited
  • 2012Fiscal implications of climate change76 cited
  • 2010The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence27 cited