The Vulgar Conception of Objects in "Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses"

Stefanie Rocknak

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Hume's philosophy and hair distribution Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise ("Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses"), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume's position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first detailed analysis of this evolution, which includes an explanation of T 1.4.2's four-part system.

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References

1739A Treatise of Human Nature 1941The Philosophy of David Hume 1997Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy 1964The philosophy of David Hume : a critical study of its origins and central doctrines 1941Hume's Theory of the External World.1985The Sceptical Realism of David Hume.1994The Objects of Hume's Treatise 1989Is Hume a Sceptic with Regard to the Senses?

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2008A Problem for Hume's Theory of Induction 2012The Vulgar Attempt to Achieve Perfect Identity

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