On Interpretivism and International Law

Abstract

This article argues for the relevance of interpretivism within theoretical and normative debates about international law. To do this, the article carries out two tasks. First, it draws out the central features of interpretivism that make it a theoretically distinct contribution to understanding the nature and theory of law. Secondly, it identifies four important objections, two external and two internal, to the relevance of interpretivism to international law. External objections stem from positivism and anti-essentialism about international law. Internal objections, on the other hand, stem from the view that international law does not suit the application of interpretivism. I show that it is possible to counter all four and conclude by pointing to the nature of future work that needs to be undertaken to develop a substantive interpretivist account of international law.

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