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- 1994Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United States860 cited
- 1981Performance Hypothesis Testing with the Sharpe and Treynor Measures860 cited
- 1994Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory610 cited
- 1995Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry491 cited
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