Leadership PAC Contribution Strategies and House Member Ambitions

Abstract

Leadership political action committees (PACs) are committees headed by federal politicians but separate from the politicians' personal campaign committees. Like other PACs, leadership PACs receive donations from individuals and groups, then make contributions to the political candidates that they support. Previous research indicates that member contribution strategies reflect both party‐based and personal goals. Using a range of data from before and after the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” this study fills a void in the existent research by testing whether or not House members with leadership PACs switch contribution strategies once their party status changes. My analysis reveals that a shift in party status tends to produce a subsequent shift in contribution strategy. My findings also suggest that members, while acting within a party‐based framework, may target their contributions in ways that also reflect their personal goals.

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