States that are essentially by-products

Abstract

Introduction Some mental and social states appear to have the property that they can only come about as the by-product of actions undertaken for other ends. They can never, that is, be brought about intelligently or intentionally, because the very attempt to do so precludes the state one is trying to bring about. In I.2 above I cited spontaneity as an example of such ‘inaccessible’ states. I shall refer to them as ‘states that are essentially by-products’. There are, of course, many states that arise as by-products of individual action, but here I focus on the subset of states that can only come about in this way. Since some of these states are useful or desirable, it is often tempting to try to bring them about – even though the attempt is certain to fail. This is the moral fallacy of by-products . Moreover, whenever we observe that some such state is in fact present, it is tempting to explain it as the result of action designed to bring it about – even though it is rather a sign that no such action was undertaken. This is the intellectual fallacy of by-products . The present chapter is an exploration of these fallacies. I first discuss the core case of an individual trying to bring about in himself a state that cannot be commanded in this way (II.2). I then have to confront an important objection: even granting the impossibility of bringing about these states just on the will's saying so, could there not be technologies allowing us to bring them about by indirect means (II.3)? I next discuss the self-defeating attempts to bring about such states in other persons, either by commands (II.4) or by non-verbal behaviour designed to impress (II.5). I then try to meet the corresponding objection, that one might be able to bring about the intended effect by faking the non-instrumental behaviour that will elicit it (II.6). A case of particular interest is that of the artist, who is constantly tempted by the twin traps of bravura and narcissism (II.7). Similarly, an irrational political system may have the property that whatever the government tries to do intentionally is thwarted, and that whatever results it can take credit for were unintended (II.8).

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