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On the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets
14 references·0 citing·38 second hop
On the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets (2014)On the role of verifiability and commitme…CREDENCE GOODS MARKETS WITH CONSCIENTIOUS AND SELFISH EXPERTS* (2011)CREDENCE GOODS MARKETS WITH C…Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair (2009)Agency Problems and Reputatio…Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods (2008)Experts vs. discounters: Cons…On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods (2006)On Doctors, Mechanics, and Co…A Theory of Fraud and Overtreatment in Experts Markets (2006)A Theory of Fraud and Overtre…When do Experts Cheat and Whom do They Target (2005)When do Experts Cheat and Who…Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods (2005)Insurance in a Market for Cre…Credence goods monopolists (2001)Credence goods monopolistsPhysician Agency (2000)Physician AgencyCredence Goods and Fraudulent Experts (1997)Credence Goods and Fraudulent…Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts (1994)Credence Goods and Fraudulent…Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services (1993)Competition in a Market for I…DEMAND INDUCEMENT AND THE PHYSICIAN/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (1988)DEMAND INDUCEMENT AND THE PHY…Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission (1987)Honesty in a Model of Strateg…Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud (1973)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures (1995)Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods (2001)Middlemen as Experts (1993)The effects of advertising and solicitation on audit fees (2009)Signaling Through Pricing by Service Providers with Social Preferences (2014)Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1964)Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1976)Chapter 14 Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets (2000)Chapter 8 Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care (2000)How payment systems affect physicians’ provision behaviour—An experimental investigation (2011)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2017)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1983)Consumer Health Information and the Demand for Medical Care (1990)Physician response to Medicare fee reductions: changes in the volume of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries in the Medicare and private sectors (1998)Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan (2007)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Economics, Organization and Management. (1993)Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets (1999)Hospital ownership and cost and quality of care: is there a dime’s worth of difference? (2001)Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry (2006)Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (1986)Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice (2003)On the use of labels in credence goods markets (2008)Research in experimental economics (2013)The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study (2010)Customer-Driven Misconduct: How Competition Corrupts Business Practices (2012)Quality and Accountability in Health Care Delivery: Audit-Study Evidence from Primary Care in India (2016)Information and Consumer Behavior (1970)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)“Golden Age,” Quiescence, and Revival (2011)The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition (2011)Game Theory and Information Economics (2018)UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE (2003)
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References

  • 2006On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods746 cited
  • 2000Physician Agency583 cited
  • 1997Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts360 cited
  • 1993Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services308 cited
  • 1988DEMAND INDUCEMENT AND THE PHYSICIAN/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP243 cited
  • 1994Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts238 cited
  • 2009Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair171 cited
  • 2001Credence goods monopolists171 cited
  • 1987Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission137 cited
  • 2005When do Experts Cheat and Whom do They Target98 cited
  • 2008Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods92 cited
  • 2005Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods67 cited
  • 2006A Theory of Fraud and Overtreatment in Experts Markets62 cited
  • 2011CREDENCE GOODS MARKETS WITH CONSCIENTIOUS AND SELFISH EXPERTS*50 cited

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