PRESERVING FINANCIAL STABILITY: A DILEMMA FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

Gillian Garcia · María Jesús Nieto

35 citations0/0 files storedContemporary Economic Policy

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Global Financial Regulation and Crises Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Finance, Markets, and Regulation

Abstract

Financial institutions are now crossing national borders within the EU. In balancing member states’ desires for sovereignty against the effectiveness of the financial safety net, banks are currently all chartered by Member States and the safety net remains largely the responsibility of individual national governments. The paper questions whether minimally harmonized national safety nets and reliance on voluntary cooperation can keep EU banks safe and sound and prevent financial contagion. The paper examines a number of proposed remedies and recommends enhancing market discipline and adopting a system of prompt corrective action and least‐cost resolution to minimize the incidence of bailouts. (JEL F36, G18, G21)

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References

2003Financial Supervision in Europe 2005Banking crisis management in the European Union: Multiple regulators and resolution authorities 2007The Structure of Financial Regulation

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2010Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision and deposit guarantees 2009Did Recent Experience of a Financial Crisis Help in Coping with the Current Financial Turmoil? The Case of the Nordic Countries 2009Financial contagion among members of the EU‐8 2009Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross‐border banks in the EU

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