Fuzzy preferences in multiple participant decision making

Abstract

A fuzzy set theoretic approach for handling preference uncertainty within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution is employed for systematically carrying out the strategic investigation of a conflict over the proposed export of water in bulk quantities. Following an overview of the literature regarding fuzzy preferences and their applications in decision making, the graph model is restructured to incorporate fuzzy preferences into calculations of stability. Nash and sequential stability definitions, which reflect human behavior in conflict, are modified to accommodate fuzzy preferences. The conflict over the potential large-scale export of water from Lake Gisborne, located in Canada’s Newfoundland and Labrador province, is modeled, assuming that one of the four Decision Makers (DMs) in the dispute has fuzzy or uncertain preferences, while the preferences of the remaining DMs are crisp. The strategic insights gained by varying the satisficing behavior of the DM with fuzzy preferences are discussed.

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