Article2014

Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined views, and then argue that these views are inconsistent with certain empirical facts about how time is represented in the brain. These facts instead support a kind of atomic view, on which temporal experiences are temporally unstructured atoms

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References

2007Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience 1992Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain 1961Perceived order in different sense modalities.2019The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness 2005MIND AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE*2003Auditory capture of vision: examining temporal ventriloquism 2012The Conscious Brain 2004Recalibration of temporal order perception by exposure to audio-visual asynchrony

Cited by

2020All in Good Time: Long-Lasting Postdictive Effects Reveal Discrete Perception 2014Rethinking the senses and their interactions: the case for sensory pluralism 2023Mental Imagery 2022Out of Time 2014Experience of and in Time 2019Is our naïve theory of time dynamical?2019Philosophy of Linguistics

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