A judges' revolution? Political corruption and the judiciary in Italy

Abstract

Abstract During the investigations into political corruption in Italy, judges emerged in the eyes of the public as the ‘heroes’ of a peaceful revolution against the ‘villainous’ politicians. The established explanation for the active role of the judiciary against corruption stresses the unusual degree of independence of Italian judges. Without denying the importance of this institutional variable, analysis of the interactions between politicians and judges in the history of the Italian Republic allows one to discuss the role of other two important variables: the informal networking between politicians and judges, and the professional culture of the magistracy. The three sets of variables are in fact used to explain two different strategies adopted by Italian judges in their interaction with the political system: a strategy of ‘role substitution’, acccording to which some judges act as a surrogate power for the protection of the citizens against corrupt politicians, and a ‘collusive strategy’, consisting of various levels of hidden exchanges between judges and politicians. This article is based on an examination of judicial documents relating to 40 episodes of political corruption, in–depth interviews with experts, reports of relevant Parliamentary Inquiry Commissions, requests for indictment of Members of Parliament, official statistics and the daily and weekly press.

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