Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and Akrasia

Abstract

In his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics John Burnet added two appendices as particularly relevant to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia (weakness). The first appendix, De Anima, III, 10, contains Aristotle's discussion of how practical reason and want combine to cause movement for the sake of something and how explanations of action can be constructed in terms of these two elements; in the other appendix, De Motu 7, Aristotle casts explanations of actions in the form of practical inferences. The relevance of these passages to Aristotle's discussion of akrasia is beyond dispute: Aristotle explicitly employs practical inferences to represent the motivations of the akrates (weak man), and he clearly regards the behavior of the akrates as a case of movement for the sake of something, a case of action. Burnet's appendices suggest what seems to me the only sound strategy for unraveling and understanding Aristotle's explanation of akrasia. We must place this explanation within Aristotle's general theory of the explanation of action and the role of practical inference in such explanation. Akrasia is a difficult case with problems peculiar to it, but all the same it is a case of movement for the sake of something, and in explaining it Aristotle follows his paradigm of the explanation of action. In this paper I wish to take full advantage of this strategy in an attempt to reconstruct in detail and take a fresh look at Aristotle's account of akrasia. The dividends of this strategy will show themselves, I hope, as I try along the way to resolve some of the textual and philosophical difficulties in Aristotle's account, difficulties traditionally and recently raised by commentators.'

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