Is Aristotle's teleology anthropocentric?

Abstract

Aristotle holds that nature does nothing pointless that natural processes are structured by the good ends they serve. But there is a strong current tendency to read him, in line with the priorities which govern his zoological works, as refusing to extend the workings of this finality in nature beyond the internal structure and functioning of individual organisms.' Some do continue to attach importance to the occasional remarks in his corpus which appear to acknowledge a broader, interactive teleology.2 My object is to support the latter party, and to do so by seeking to illuminate the actual structure of the global teleology in question. In a word, I hope to show that this structure is anthropocentric. What do I mean by suggesting that Aristotle might have a natural teleology centred on man? After all, if there is one thing that we know for certain about Aristotle, it is that he believes in a cosmic hierarchy in which god, not man, is the best being. To explain what I have in mind, I will take

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