Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions

Ehud Lehrer A

44 citations0/0 files storedMathematics of Operations Research

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

Four kinds of correlated equilibrium payoff sets in undiscounted repeated games with nonobservable actions are studied. Three of them. the upper, the uniform, and Banach lead to the same payoff set, whereas the lower one in general is associated with a larger set. The extensive form correlated equilibrium is also explored. It turns out that both the regular and extensive form correlated equilibria yield the same sets of payoffs.

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References

1974Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies 1986Multistage Games with Communication 1989Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations 1986An Approach to Communication Equilibria 1981Survey of Repeated Games 1989Existence of Correlated Equilibria 1990Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information 1991Internal correlation in repeated games

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2004Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring 2003Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring 2007Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring n.d.The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs

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