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Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets
6 references·16 citing·34 second hop
Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets (1997)Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided …Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement (2023)Matching Mechanisms for Refug…Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (2018)Marketplaces, Markets, and Ma…The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (2017)The Welfare Effects of Coordi…Improving matching under hard distributional constraints (2017)Improving matching under hard…An invitation to market design (2017)An invitation to market designImproving schools through school choice: A market design approach (2016)Improving schools through sch…The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2013)The “Boston” school-choice me…Matching Markets: Theory and Practice (2013)Matching Markets: Theory and …An analysis of the German university admissions system (2012)An analysis of the German uni…School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2011)School Admissions Reform in C…On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (2011)On two kinds of manipulation …Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match (2009)Strategy-proofness versus Eff…Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (2006)Incomplete information and si…Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets (2006)Games of Capacity Manipulatio…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design (1999)The Redesign of the Matching …Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? (1999)Can Pre-arranged Matches Be A…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignManipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)Matching with Contracts (2005)Selling Spectrum Rights (1994)Digitization and the Contract Labor Market: A Research Agenda (2013)An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match (2018)The assignment game I: The core (1971)Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory (2016)Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis (2018)Matching Algorithms: Fundamentals, Applications and Challenges (2021)Job Market Signaling (1973)American Economic Review (2019)Model and analysis of labor supply for ride-sharing platforms in the presence of sample self-selection and endogeneity (2019)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects (2021)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas (2015)Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing (2021)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)On cores and indivisibility (1974)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited

Cited by

  • 2018Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design147 cited
  • 2012An analysis of the German university admissions system146 cited
  • 1999The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design140 cited
  • 2013Matching Markets: Theory and Practice134 cited
  • 2017The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match134 cited
  • 2017Improving matching under hard distributional constraints97 cited
  • 2011School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation95 cited
  • 2013The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach91 cited
  • 2023

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Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement
76 cited
  • 2011On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems74 cited
  • 2016Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach74 cited
  • 2006Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets72 cited
  • 1999Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?71 cited
  • 2017An invitation to market design70 cited
  • 2009Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match68 cited
  • 2006Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets58 cited