Let's stick together: Understanding Africa's secessionist deficit

Abstract

Over the last 40 years, Africa has experienced relatively fewer secessionist conflicts than most other regions of the world, even though it is otherwise plagued with political violence and its countries tend to display a higher prevalence of many of the factors usually associated with separatism. After empirically establishing Africa’s secessionist deficit, this article reviews the few existing explanations for it before articulating a theory which singles out the benefits to African regional elites (and those who depend on them) of weak sovereign states. In Africa as elsewhere, the article argues, regional leaders can be expected to capitalize on local grievances and promote secessions if the potential rewards of a separatist state, in the absence of international recognition, outweigh the potential rewards associated with control or partial control of institutions of the sovereign national state. What distinguishes African elites is the relatively greater material returns to sovereignty that they face. Given the continent’s poverty, the undiversified nature and commodity dependence of its economies, and the relative lack of accountability of state power, Africa offers a significant material premium to internationally recognized sovereignty, tilting the odds for elites in favour of staying within the state, even if they do not immediately benefit from power at the centre. The article then tests the argument against actual African cases of secession, showing that they are usually a function of variations in the relative rewards of sovereignty. In conclusion, it argues that Africa’s weak sovereignty equilibrium has contributed to its failure to develop.

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