Mental Illness and Roots of Genius

Abstract

In earlier writings, I addressed presumptive similarities between creative cognition and deviant cognition that reflect a predisposition to psychosis (e.g., Prentky, 1980, 1989). I proposed that certain biologically conceived cognitive styles that are peculiar to extraordinary creativity possess common biological ancestry with certain cognitive styles that are associated with a predisposition to major mental illness. In this article, I revisit some of the assumptions made in the neurocognitive model set forth in my earlier writings. In particular, I suggest that the normal range of input regulation is distorted by imbalances in hemispheric activity, resulting in 2 very different data-processing strategies that enhance or facilitate creative solutions to problems. Due to the fact that these imbalances are often associated with genetic predispositions to mental illness, there is a greater-than-chance probability that highly creative individuals may evidence signs or symptoms of mental illness. In addition, I address the question of whether creativity possesses a uniquely consanguineous relation to affective disorders or to a broader range of afflictions. I conclude with a plea for an empirical strategy that addresses the seemingly intractable methodological problems associated with research on creativity.

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