Parsimony, Likelihood, and the Principle of the Common Cause

Elliott R. Sober

19 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy of Science

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Philosophy and History of Science Philosophy, Science, and History Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

The likelihood justification of cladistic parsimony suggested in Sober (1984) is here shown to be incomplete. Even so, cladistic parsimony remains a counterexample to the principle of the common cause formulated by Reichenbach (1956) and Salmon (1975, 1979, 1984).

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1985Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World 2020Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World 1979Hans Reichenbach: Logical Empiricist 1983Parsimony in Systematics: Philosophical Issues 1979Why Ask, ‘Why?’? An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation 1984Common Cause Explanation

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