Abstract The paper explores the efficiency consequences of using temporary protection to ease adjustment following an unexpected, permanent improvement in a country's terms of trade. In the model, workers trade off the potentially higher wage that the export sector has to offer with a lower job acquisition rate. An unexpected improvement in the terms of trade surprises old workers who cannot undo the decisions they made while young. Some old workers who had not planned to search for work in the export sector end up changing their plans, adding to the pool of searchers, creating congestion. Temporary protection can reduce congestion and make the transition to the new steady state smoother. Moreover, there are conditions under which the congestion externalities lead to multiple steady‐state equilibria that can be Pareto‐ranked. Temporary protection may lead to a permanent change in the allocation of resources, and this permanent change may be welfare‐enhancing.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 21 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.