Interior collective optimum in a voluntary contribution to a public-goods game

Walid Hichri

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

This study shows a public good experiment with four different treatments. The payoff function is chosen so that the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the collective optimum (CO) are both in the interior of the strategy space. This study tries to test the effect of varying the level of the collective optimum, which changes the ‘social dilemma’, involved in the decision as to how much to contribute to the public good. The results show that contributions increase with the level of the interior CO. There is overcontribution in comparison to the NE and undercontribution in comparison to the CO. But contributions are as far from the CO as the level of the former increases. An overcontribution index that takes into account the effective contribution relative to both the NE and the CO, shows that subjects adopt a constant behaviour while passing from one treatment to another: they contribute a constant share of the CO.

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References

1995The Handbook of experimental economics 1980Social Dilemmas 2002Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion?1990An Experimental Test Of The Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis 1997Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: How much 1998A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games 1996Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy 1998Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

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