A Kantian-Style Critique of Person-in-Environment

Abstract

This article provides a historical and philosophical analysis of the intellectual thought supporting ecological systems theory and the person-in-environment model. It offers a critique outlining both strengths and shortcomings by analyzing the claims to validity upon which the theory rests. These claims rest on an analogy with various theories empirically established in the natural sciences; as such, validity claims rest heavily upon the emphasis of humans' continuity with animals. Consequently, the claims' shortcomings arise from their inability to address adequately issues arising from qualities that make humans distinct from animals—such as language and its impact upon culture, history, human relationships, and our ability to construct our environment and thus do more than simply interact with the environment.

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