Rawls’s ‘Justice as Fairness’: A Moral Basis for Contemporary Planning Theory

Abstract

John Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ provides a firm moral basis for contemporary planning theory, offering both a procedure for arriving at the ethical principles which should govern a society, and the substantive principles of justice which he argues best embody the moral ideals of liberty and equality for constitutional liberal democracies. It offers an objective justification for public planning which does not require foundationalism, and fits a liberal democratic context. In 2001, Rawls’s Justice as Fairness: A Restatement summarized the revisions to (or clarifications of) his original theory over the previous 30 years. This article reviews aspects of his theory which are relevant to public planning, concluding that Rawls offers a normative rationale for planning, a basis for practical critique, a reason for hope, and a vision of reasonable, free and equal citizens cooperating to achieve justice as fairness.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 46 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.