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The Value of Humanity and Kant's Conception of Evil Matthew Caswell Recent years have seen the development of a powerful reinterpretation of Kant's basic approach in ethical thought. Kant, it is argued, should not be read as defending the stark, metaphysics-laden formalism for which his theory is so famous. Rather, the reinterpreters claim that the heart of Kantian practical philosophy is the absolute value of humanity, or human rational nature. 1 Kant's ethics can thus be understood as a "theory of value," 2 in which the singular value of our own end-setting capacity as rational agents is taken as supreme, or even as the source of all value. On this reading, morality is just acting in such a way that respects or promotes the value of humanity. Moreover, this value may be deduced through an immanent, regressive argument about the conditions of practical agency as such, according to which any adequate conception of ourselves as agents commits us, finally, to moral norms. The consequences of this approach to Kantian ethics for such central issues as the doctrine of transcendental freedom, ethical formalism, the meaning of Kantian deontology, and indeed the very picture of human moral life for which Kant's theory is meant to account are profound. The evaluation of the value of humanity interpretation ultimately must examine the challenge posed to the traditional readings of these doctrines in a comprehensive manner. A contribution to this evaluation, however, can be made by a consideration of the relation of the conception [End Page 635] of the value of humanity to a far-reaching but relatively neglected element of Kant's theory, namely, his theory of evil as strictly ethically accountable. In the following analysis, I will show that the assignment of absolute value to humanity is incompatible with Kant's conception of evil. Accordingly, it will be shown that humanity, at least in so far as it is understood in the influential writings of several recent interpreters, cannot be taken by Kant as absolutely morally valuable. 3 In the first part of this paper, we shall see how Kant's theory of the "original predisposition" (Anlage), presented as part of Kant's investigation of evil in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, denies the central claim of the value of humanity interpretation (Rel, 6:26–28). 4 Next I show why the position defended in the theory of the original Anlage is required by Kant's commitment to the imputability of evil. I will then consider whether the position of the Religion is compatible with the Groundwork argument so favored by the reinterpreters, in which Kant claims that the categorical imperative commands us to treat humanity in ourselves and in others as an end in itself. In the second part of the paper, several leading proponents of the value of humanity interpretation will be examined and criticized in the light of Kant's views uncovered in the first part. I close with brief remarks on the importance of the conception of evil for Kantian theory. 1. Kant's Conception of Evil and the Normative Independence of Humanity and personality Book One of the Religion contains Kant's definitive treatment of the issue of evil. In his investigation, Kant is committed to the basic imputability of evil to an extent rarely matched in the history of philosophy. For Kant, everything for which we can be praised or blamed—everything for which we are morally accountable, and thus everything that is morally good or evil—must necessarily be the product [End Page 636] of a free will. 5 This means that certain desires, or even our sensuous nature in general, cannot be the source of evil, for our sensuousness is not a product of our own freedom, but an imposition of unfree nature. If our will were overpowered by sensuous influences, such that we were compelled by natural forces to deviate from the law, we could...
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