Choice Shifts In Political Decisionmaking: Federal Judges and Civil Liberties Cases

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to investigate whether group‐induced attitudinal shifts in decisionmaking take place outside the experimental laboratory and whether choice shift theory can be applied to the understanding of political behavior of actors engaged in socially relevant decisionmaking. A random sample of civil liberties decisions in Federal District Courts for the years 1963–1968 were examined. The hypothesis that there are systematic differences between single‐judge and collegial court decisions was confirmed. Parties claiming a violation of constitutional rights increase the probability of successfully convincing a district judge when they are able to have their litigation heard by a three‐judge court. The finding that judges are more likely to shift to a libertarian position when moving from the individual to the collegial decisionmaking condition holds when the data are examined in aggregate form as well as when the behavior of individual judges is studied under both decisionmaking settings.

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