Why Is There a Discussion of False Belief in the Theaetetus?

Abstract

Why Is There a Discussion of False Belief in the Theaetetus? HUGH H. BENSON IN PLATO'S THEAETETU$, Theaetetus and Socrates attempt to define what knowledge is. Theaetetus offers the following four definitions. First, he suggests that knowledge is geometry, astronomy, calculation, shoemaking and "the crafts of the other craftsmen." Second, he suggests that knowledge is perception; third, that knowledge is true belief; and finally, that knowledge is true belief with an account. After getting clear what the particular definitions amount to, Socrates refutes each of them, so that the dialogue ends in a typically Socratic fashion: both Theaetetus and Socrates claim to be at a loss concerning what knowledge is. Socrates' response to Theaetetus' third definition, the definition that knowledge is true belief (which I will call (KTB)), however, cannot help but stand out. For, rather than following this definition with a clarification and then a refutation, Socrates instead raises the following questions which he says have been bothering him for a long time. (Tl) what is the state [of believing falsely] in us and how does it come about? (187d3-4) He hesitates to consider these questions here, but after being reminded by Theaetetus that he had just a moment ago made the point that there was no hurry in discussions such as these, decides that this is not a bad moment to consider them. It is not until thirteen pages later that Socrates returns explicitly to the third definition, (KTB), and when he does, it only takes him one page to refute it. The question that I want to address in this essay is why these questions get considered here. Why are the problems associated with false belief raised between Theaetetus' proposal that knowledge is true belief 087b--c ) and Socrates' refutation of that proposal (2ood-~olc)? What role, that is, do these thirteen pages (187c-~ood) play in the structure of the dialogue 's argument? [1711 172 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 30:2 APRIL 1992 It seems to me that there have been basically three types of answers to this question. First, the most common answer is that this passage is simply a digression . Cornford, for example, writes that: "Instead of developing and criticizing Theaetetus' new suggestion, Socrates here goes back to a point that arose in the Defense of Protagoras."' According to Cornford, prior to 187b Plato has only offered an ad hominem argument against the Protagorean doctrine that no one can believe falsely. At x88c-2ood, Plato attempts to put forward a more general argument for the possibility of false belief. Unfortunately, this argument is doomed to fail for the same reason Plato's attempt to define knowledge is doomed to fail, viz., Plato's unwillingness to appeal to Forms in the Theaetetus. On Cornford's view, then, there are no philosophical reasons for this discussion of false belief to occur subsequent to Theaetetus' proposal that knowledge is true belief. There may, of course, be stylistic or dramatic reasons, but philosophically the passage is simply a digression. A second view has been suggested by McDowell. He, too, apparendy thinks this passage is essentially a digression, but, unlike Cornford, suggests a philosophical explanation for its position. According to McDowell, "it is plausible that in order to be able to understand Theaetetus' new account of knowledge as being true judgement, we must be able to make sense of the notion of false judgement as well; and the discussion which follows deals with difficulties in making sense of the notion of false judgement."" McDowell recognizes, however , that Socrates' and Theaetetus' inability to make sense of false belief is not taken by Plato to suffice for the rejection of Theaetetus' proposal. A third view has been more recently suggested by Fine.s She suggests that there is a particular model of knowledge, which she calls the acquaintance model of knowledge, that supports (KTB). In the false belief passage, she suggests, Plato offers an argument to the effect that if such a model of knowledge is accepted, false belief is impossible. But, since, according to Plato, false belief is possible, it follows that the acquaintance model should not be accepted . Thus, on Fine's view, Plato should...

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 33 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.